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When investors diversify their capital venn1res, the consequence of one
financial failure is substantially decreased. Therefore, smart investment practices combined with the protective reform of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act
provides reasonable protection for invesrors. The recent combination of substantive, responsive, and preventative legislation indicates that there is effective corporate policy pressure in the United States. These responsive and
preventative changes to securities regulations put adequate pressure on corporations to maintain ethical business practices, effectively and efficiently
protecting the prudent investor.

Corporate Scandals: Can Businesses Be Trusted?

Charisa L. Player*

Some optimists wiLl no doubt argue that companies, by and large, remain
trustworthy ... Howeve1; the pmence of such a watershed ofji-audulent activities has brought attention to some basic problems.

T

rust in companies has been destroyed in recent years, and rightly so.
Companies once hailed as headed by innovative geniuses and touted as
"One of the Best Companies to Work For"' have folded in incredible displays of mismanagement and fraud. Some optimists will no doubt argue that
companies, by and large, remain trustworthy. After all, only a small percentage of companies have had the need co restate earnings and overhaul accounting methods. However, the presence of such a watershed of fraudulent
activities has brought attention to some basic problems. William T. Allen
said, "Enron is not just the hundred year flood offraud, bur is in fact a warning that there are fimdamental weaknesses that require immediate attention."1 This essay will (I) suggest that a particular sector of business is more
prone to fraudulent activities, (2) analyze the role of employee ethics in the
downfall of a company, and (3) examine the viabilicy of the proposed solutions for amending these fundamental weaknesses.
* Charisa Player has won several awards fo r her writing, including placing in
the Michael L. Rosten contest and the Disneyland Creativity Challenge. A mother
of three boys, she plans to emer law school in 2005.
1 Enron appeared in rhe top 100 Companies in 1999, 2000, and 2001 in Fortune Magazine. As discussed in "Restoring Ethical Gumption in the Corporation: A
Federalist Paper on Corporate Governance, Restoration of Active Virtue in rhe Corporate Strucrure to Curb the 'YeeHaw Culture' in Organizations," Wyoming Law Review 3 (2003): 400.
1 As quoted in •'The Enron Failure and Cor porate Governance Reform," \.%ke
Forest Law Review 33 (2003): 855.
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THE PROBLEM WITH NONTANGIBLE PRODUCTS

Businesses typically earn a profit by selling one of t\'Vo things: a tangible
product or serv~ce. Tangible product-based companies are fairly well structured in terms predicting expected earnings and reasonable profit expectations. Financial structure in a product-centered company revolves around
che costs of production, which includes supplies, packaging, assembly, and
logistics. Profits are predicted according to these costs of production, the
available supply relative to expected demand, and the price that can reasonably be charged for the product. The costs of production and a limited
supply keep the market stable and the profit expectations reasonable.
Service and nontangible product sales are a great deal less strucrured.
The value of call waiting or financial advice is more difficult to measure and
possible profits from sales of such intangibles are les.s botmded.
Corporate scandals akin to Enron are not new.: After the stock market
crash of 1929, Middle West Utilities was forced co declare bankruptcy after
its "elaborate webs of holding companies, each helping hide the others'
financial weaknesses"; failed to keep the company afloat. Ivan Boesky and
Michael Milliken have served jail time for the savings and loans junk bond
scandals of rhe '80s. More than a few dot-com companies came crashing
down in the late '90s following unsustainable profits and growth. Enron wasn't solely concerned with energy sales. It also dabbled in the telecom business.'
Companies at rhe forefrom of recent scandals (Enron, Tyco, Adelphia,
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Dynegy, Net\'Vork Associates, and Qwest, to
name a few) have all shared the common thread of selling telecommunications. Enron described itself as "one of the world's leading electricity, natural gas and communications companies, which markets electricity and
natural gas, delivers physical commodities and financial and risk management services to companies around the world.">
Economics teaches us that the cost and price of a product is based on
the principles of supply and demand. A rugher demand allows a higher price
; "Reswring Erhical Gumption" Wyoming Law Review 3 (2003): 419.
' "A Primer on Enron," California Western Law Review 39 (2003): 196.
5 Ibid., 169.
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and greater profit potential.• The fundamental weal<ness in telecommunications companies is the lack of supply as a significant bounding factor.
Tangible-product based organizations, when calculating possible proflrs,
must take into consideration many costs that a service-based organization
can ignore. The product must not only be researched and developed, but it
also must be laboratOry tested, and possibly FDA approved, requiring a large
amount of capital. The company must purchase and warehouse the raw materials. The product requires manpower to transform the raw materials into
the finished product. lr must be packaged, inventoried, and moved to retailers. The costs of production keep the supply finite.
After the telephone deregulation in the 1980s, the phone companies
were handed a ready-made infrastructure of phone wires and circuitry already in place and operating, with a previously captive customer base. With
minimal hardware and soft\'Vare upgrades, phone companies began to offer
more than just local and long distance. They began to offer additional services such as call waiting, 3-way calling, and even the occasional car phone.
The only product that these telecom companies actually sell are the cell
phones customers use to access the net\'Vork.
Services like long distance access and cell phone plans require no inventory, no raw materials, no warehouses. The telecom companies sell services
that are handled by computers. At first look, it would seem that telecom
prices would be based on the supply of bandwidth the companies have to
offer. However, these companies were carrying inventory, in terms of bandwidth, so large that there could never be a market of buyers large enough to
fill capacity.7 This created a market that required little initial capital to establish an infrastructure and the appearance of unlimited profit potential.
EMPLOYEE ETHICS

It is a general consensus that employee ethics are at the heart of the
recent corporate scandals. Unethical practices have a tendency to permeate
6 "The Fundamenrals of Sound Business," California Westem Law Review 39
(2003): 298 .
' Jennings, in "A Primer on Enron," Galifornia 'Western Law Review 39 (2003):
258.
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"Restoring Ethical Gumption" Wyomi11g Law Review 3 (2003): 419.
• "A Primer on Enrou," Califomia l¥0stern Law Review 39 (2003): 196.
s Ibid., 169.
3
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Tangible-product based organizations, when calculating possible profits,
must take into consideration many costs that a service-based organization
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the finished product. It must be packaged, inventoried, and moved to retailers. T he costs of production keep the supply finite.
After the telephone deregulation in the 1980s, the phone companies
were handed a ready-made infrastructure of phone wires and circuitry already in place and operating, with a previously captive customer base. With
minimal hardware and software upgrades, phone companies began to offer
more than just local and long distance. T hey began to offer additional services such as call waiting, 3-way calling, and even the occasional car phone.
The only product that these telecom companies actually sell are the cell
phones customers use to access the nervvork.
Services like long distance access and cell phone plans require no inventory, no raw materials, no warehouses. The telecom companies sell services
that are handled by computers. At first look, it would seem that telecom
prices would be based on the supply of bandwidth the companies have to
offer. However, these companies were carrying inventory, in terms of bandwidth, so large that there could never be a market of buyers large enough to
fill capacity.? This created a market that required little initial capital to establish an infrastructure and the appearance of unlimited profit potential.
EMPLOYEE ETHICS

lr is a general consensus that employee ethics are at the heart of the
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6 "The Fundamentals of Sound Business," Califomia l¥0stern Law Review 39
(2003): 298.
' Jennings, in "A Primer on Enron," California \¥estern Law Review 39 (2003):
258.
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an entire organization. An example of trickle-down corruption would be
Tyco's acquisitio n of ADT Security Services and rhe resulting change of protocol. Salespeople were rold to rarget "rhe scummiest neighborhoods possible . .. neighborhoods where rhere were problems. "• Tyco did this to boost
their numbers. They were not interested in keeping these contracts on a
long-term basis, nor were rhey interested in the customers' weiJ-being. In the
interest of the appearance of immediate growth they signed contractS with
customers of very poor creclit. 9
There have been several studies done on the implicit nature of employee
trust. Employees, for the most parr, trust management for no o ther reason
than the fact that management is in a position of authority. Stanley Milgram ,
a behavioral psychology professor at Yale University, has said, "A substantial
proportion of people do what they're cold to do, irrespective of the conrem
of rhe act and without limitations of conscience, so long as they perceive that
the command comes from a legitimate amhority." 10 Milgram also reported
his findings that 65 percent of his subjects would inflict pain on ocher
hwnan beings if told to do so by someone they perceived robe an authority
figure. 11 A 200 I survey of CFOs also found rhar 17 percent of CFOs at public companies feel pressure to misrepresent financial resulrs.U Employees at
Enron who sported accounting irregularities were highly motivated by the
executives ro do as they were told and to nor question rhe fin ancial repon ing they were asked to do. 1J It would appear that rhe pressure to follow an
authority fi gure is strong, even when unethical behavior is involved.
This is nor ro say employees are automatons. The Lurheran Brotherhood, an insurance group, conducted a survey that showed 38 percent of
their respondents would ralk ro their supervisors abour an ethical dilemma
that they were facing in rhe company, 23 percent said rhey would either do
8

Jennings, in "Restoring Ethical Gumption" Wyoming Law Review 3 (2003):
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nothing, quit, or were unsure what they would do; 40 percent said rhey
would cry to find a way to resolve the conflict without losing their jobs.'• Despite these findings, however scientific the surveys purport to be, asking a
hyporhetical question yields different results rhan if the respondents were acrually faced with the dilemma and rheir jobs were truly on the line and at
odds with their morals.
Whi le much of the responsibility for the sudden earnings restatements
and accounting overhauls can be laid at the feet of the CFO, ethical troubles
pervaded these tdecom companies and were present nor only at the top.
THE VIABILITY OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Several recent articles have attempted to guanri~r the issues that caused
the culrure that would create Enron. Marianne Jennings, in particular, suggests seven factors which lead to the "Yeehaw" culture char created the recent
scandals. 1; These factors include che pressure to maintain the unsustainable
numbers and performance, an employee culture of fear and silence, che
young 'uns and the bigger-than-life CEO, a weak board, a culcure of conflicts in interest, a culture of innovation like no other spurred on by the tech
boom, and a culture of social responsibility.
Business ethics played a major role in these scandals. 1~
The great criticism of English theories of mility was rhar chey allow
the possibility of "moral corruption" to set in. If ethical behaviour is
justified in terms of its beneficial effects, surely it can be adjusted o r
an1ended in the light of those effects. If an overwhelming financial
benefit follows from Aouting an erhical principle, obeying the
principle ceases to be a "best policy" and becomes a burden. T he best
policy becomes to ditch the erhics. 1"

46S .

• lhid.
w Ibid., 39 1.
11
Sec hnp://www.sranleymilgram .com/quotes.html fill· more informacion on
Scan ley Milgram's social research findings.
12
From "CFOs Join Their Bosses on the Hot Seat," USA Today, July 16, 2002,
as reported in "Rescoring Echical Gumption," U}oming Law Review 3 (2003): 43 1.
t) Wyoming Law Review 3 (2003) : 439.

"Workplace Ethics Dilemma," USA 'fodll)\ February 15, 1999, as reported in
Wyoming Law Review 3 (2003): 495.
" Jennings, ''Restoring Ethical Gumption in rhe Corporation" U:voming Law
Review 3 (2003): 163
'" Ibid., 4 10.
1
- Personnel Today, May 2003, 13.
'~
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46S.

• Jennings, in "Restoring Erhical Gump£ion" Wyoming Law Revi(tv 3 (2003):

• Ibid.
'(' Ibid., 391.
" See hnp://www.stanleymilgram .com/quotes.html fill· more informacion on
Stanley Milgram's social research findings.
' 2 From "CFOs Join Their Bosses on the Hot Seat," USA Today, July 16, 2002,
as reported in ''Restoring Ethical Gumption," Wyoming Law Review 3 (2003): 431.
1
~ Wyomi11g Law Review 3 (2003): 439.
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nothing, quit, or were unsure what they would do; 40 percent said they
would try to find a way to resolve rhe conflict without losing their jobs. 14 Despire these findings, however scienrific the surveys purport to be, asking a
hypothetical question yields different results than if the respondents were actually faced ·with the dilemma and their jobs were truly on the line and ar
odds with their morals.
While much of the responsibility for rhe sudden earnings restatemems
and accounting overhauls can be laid at the feet of the CFO, ethical troubles
pervaded these tdecom companies and were present not only at the cop.
THE VlABILITY OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Several recent articles have attempted to quantify the issues that caused
the culture that would create Enron. Marianne Jennings, in particular, suggests seven factors which lead to the "Yeehaw" culture rhat created rhe recent
scandals.'; These factors include rhe pressure co maintain rhe unsustainable
numbers and performance, an employee culture of fear and silence, the
young 'uns and the bigger-than-life CEO, a weak board, a culture of confliers in interest, a culture of innovation like no orher spurred on by the tech
boom, and a culture of social responsibility.
Business ethics played a major role in these scandals. •~
The great criticism of English theories of urility was that they allow
the possibility of "moral corruption" co set in. If ethical behaviour is
justified in terms of its beneficial effects, surely ir can be adjusted or
an1ended in the light of those effects. If an overwhelming financial
benefit follows from flouting an ethical principle, obeying the
principle ceases to be a "best policy" and becomes a burden. The best
policy becomes to ditch the ethics.''

"Workplace Erhics Dil~,;mma." USA 1odrz)~ February IS, 1999, as reported in
Wyoming Law Review 3 (2003): 49"i .
I ) Jennings, ''Restoring Ethical Gumption in the Corporation" w:voming Lrzw
Review 3 (2003): 163
11' Ibid., 410.
,- Personnel Today, May 2003, 13.
14
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Ethics are a touchy issue and not easily defined, except as a list of things
one can and cannot do (as in Sarbanes-Oxley). T here is a clear difference between social ethics and business ethics: business ethics focuses on the ultimate goal to pursue money, social ethics is more focused on the pursuit of
happiness. One of the professors at a meeting for the Society for Business
Ethics was heard ro say, "Let's face it. We are all in colleges of business because we wanted more money. We sold out years ago. "'~ ln a matter unrelated to the pursuit o f mo ney, 82 percent of executives confess that they
cheat at the game of golf. Ironically, 99 percent of those same CEOs profess
to be honest in business. "
Despite these admissions Enron's accoundng, at first, was perfectly
within legal boundaries. When the Special Purpose Entities (SPEs)
became unsustainable, business ethics dictated that social ethics
must be trumped in the pursuit of money. Business schools are
being singled our as a potential beginning to the pervasive nature of
business ethics: "The notions from the rest of campus on moral relativism and there being no absolute truth have invaded business
ethics discussions as well as courses in managemenr and marketing.
The prevailing ethical theory of stakeholderism is nor an ethical
theory at all bur a convenjenr tool of analysis thar perm irs the justification and rationalization of any business decision so long as the
business is acting in the best interest of some stakeholder group.
Teaching a value system with shifting accountability could not be
more subversive.l~
There is some proof to support the assertion that there is a change in the values of graduates brought about by business school training.11
To prevent these sorts of company collapses and widespread fraud, several layers of fixes, patterned after models described in The Federalist Papers,
have been suggested: internal fixes such as an employee hotline, employment
1s

228.
1
"

~
21

Jennings, "A Primer on Eoron" Califimlill Western Law Review 39 (2003):
Ibid .. 261.
Ibid .. 230.
Ibid., 231.
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of an ethics officer, use of a code of ethics wirh ethics training, curbing social
responsibility, and hiring employees over the age of forty.ll The quasiinternal fixes deal with the board, separation of the chairman and CEO positions, and the use of independent auditors.L1 One of the fundamental principles behind these proposals is the sum wisdom of the employees of a
com pany far exceeds the wisdom of those on the board.'4
These fixes are impractical and unlikely. They call for a dramatic and
costly restructuring char is not likely to occur within a company already in
financial difficulty. An employee hotline may be set up by these companies
to maintain an open corridor for whistle-blowers and chose with concerns;
however, unless the employee is able to maimain strict anonymjry, it is likely
this would backfire, causing more fear and silence in the resulting meetings between the managers and those who have complaints to discuss their
concerns.
Many of these companies already had a code of ethics for their employees to sign and maintain. However, ingenuiry leads co loopholes. Kenneth
Lay signed a code of ethics waiver ro allow an employee to participate in the
management of several SPEs set up to absorb company debe and artificially
manufacture equity.ls Unless the code of ethics is completely universal
within a corporation and carries stiff internal penalties for violations, it will
have no teeth.
Removing conAicts of interest by curbing social responsibilities, such as
charitable contributions, is unlikely to help the company's ethics and appearance of trustworthiness, and it is nor likely that companies will hire
more experienced and therefore more costly employees based only on the
hope these would offset ethical issues that may arise.

:l "Jennings' fiXeS are designed to prevent anorher Enron and the resulting
spate of corporate restatemenrs," \\:)'oming Law Review 3 (2003): 39.3.
'·' Ibid.. 504.
!.i Alexander Hamilwn wrore, 'The collccrivc wisdom of employees always
exceeds the collective wisdom of managemenr, '' as quo red in "Restoring Ethical
Gumption," W'yoming Law Review 3 (2003): 491.
1
' Jennings, "A Primer on Enron," California W'mrrn Law Review 39 (2003):
203.
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to maintain an open corridor for whistle-blowers and those with concerns;
however, unless the employee is able to maimain strict anonymity, it is likely
this would backfire, causing more fear and silence in the resulting meetings between the managers and those who have complaints to discuss their
concerns.
Many of these companies already had a code of ethics for their employees to sign and maintain. However, ingenuiry leads to loopholes. Kenneth
Lay signed a code of ethics waiver ro allow an employee to participate in the
management of several SPEs set up to absorb company debt and artificially
manufacture equity. ~; Unless the code of ethics is completely universal
within a corporation and carries stiff internal penalties for violations, it will
have no teeth.
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charitable contributions, is unlikely to help the company's ethics and appearance of trustworthiness, and it is not likely that companies will hire
more experienced and therefore more costly employees based only on the
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"Jennings' ftxes are designed to prevent another Enron and the resulting
spate of corporate restatements," \\'ryoming Law Review 3 (2003): 393.
u Ibid., 504.
" Alexander Hamilton wrote, "The collecrive wisdom of employees always
exceeds the collective wisdom of management," as quoted in "Restoring Ethical
Gumption," ~\'ryoming Law Review 3 (2003): 49 1.
" Jennings, "A Primer on Enron," Califomia W'estern Law Review 39 (2003):
203.
22
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Ocher fixes have come in the form of government SEC reform. There is
doubt char Sarbanes-Oxley has stipulated draconic measures against
chose who violate the specific duties set forth. However, behavioral economistS have questioned the SEC's ability to regulate, given that the SEC may
suffer more from behavioral economic biases than investors. Choi and
Pritchard suggest that until these biases are addressed the SEC will not be
able to adequately perform irs duties.~6
The largest aces of reform (such as passing Congressional laws like
Sarbanes-Oxley, the Insider Trading Sanctions Act, and the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act) came about only when the SEC was
moved into action by large corporate scandal.~' It is the SEC's duty to prevent these breaches of trust; these scandals call into question the effectiveness of the SEC. Because scandals become a threat ro the existence of the
SEC, they are quickly addressed, usually by a law mandating an increased
disclosure of some sore. Proposals that suggest new market self-regulation
would be a better solution chan SEC oversight are consistently dismissed.'M
Unforcunarely, once a law is passed- there is question as to why
Sarbanes-Oxley passed as quickly as it did, without time tO thoroughly consider the ramifications-it usually takes on a life of its own, becoming extremely difficult to revoke.~ 9 "The marker correctS irs mistakes; regulators
frequently resist doing so."J<J
While the SEC may have rhe invesror's best interests at heart, it is wise
to remember that overregulation will lead only to a depression in companies'
ability to operate. It remains to be seen what the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley
will be. More legislation is not the answer and will only create more
problems than it proposes ro fix.
zo Apparendy, rhe Behavioral Economic Theory, which is yer ro be defined,
won the Nobel Prize for Economics recently. I will admit rhat "Behavioral Economics and the SEC" is a fascinating read that delicately sledgehammers the poinr that
the SEC is inadequate to fulfill its duties. Stanford Law Re-view 56 (2003): 4.
z• Stanford Law &view 56 (2003): 24.
lM Ibid., 5.
};o) Ibid., 39.
J(l From "Behavioral Economics and the SEC," rhc SEC's mission is threefold
as summarized by Arthur Levitt, chairman of rhe SEC: "Investor protection is our
legal mandate. lnvcsror prorecrion is our moral responsibility. lnvcsror protection is
my rop personal prioriry," Stanford Law Review 56 (2003): 7.
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Considering all these implausible solutions to an apparent crisis of ethics
and faith among the American people and irs business, how, then, can faith
be restored? The short answer is that it can't-at least, not immediately. Even
if all the suggested fixes are taken into practice and the companies survive
such costly changes as a major restructuring, it will not be enough m quickly
restore the faith of the public. That return of trust will be a long time coming and must be earned ten times over. The culture of business ethics will remain unchanged so long as srudenrs continue to embrace the shifting, sandy
foundation of a relativist basis for ethics, believing that the financial success
of a company trumps imegrity on any day of the week. Scandals will continue despite the extreme penalties imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley and the
newly awakened SEC. No law can induce honesty.
Unfortunately, there is no easy antidote preventing consumers, customers, and invesrors from being taken in by companies that seem sound
but are instead a house of cards behind a well-constructed fa~de. The best
solmion requires work that begins with lhe establishment of an absolute
moral ground for our MBAs and all those who make a living in our capitalist economy. It requires the ethical training and honesty of all those who
work in our capitalist economy. Most of all, it requires a special level of care
among those who do business with intangible productS, particularly
telecommunications, to m aintain the integrity of its employees and leaders.

54

Brigham Young Universiry Prelaw Review

[Vol. 18

Other fixes have come in the form of government SEC reform. There is
no doubt that Sarbanes-Oxley has stipulated draconic measures against
those who violate the specific duties set forth. However, behavioral economistS have questioned the SEC's abiliry to regulate, given that the SEC may
suffer more from behavioral economic biases than investors. C hoi and
Pritchard suggest chat until these biases are addressed the SEC will not be
able to adequately perform irs duties.-!6
The largest acts of reform (such as passing Congressional laws like
Sarbanes-Oxley, the Insider Trading Sanctions Act, and the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcemenr Act) came about only when the SEC was
moved into action by large corporate scandal.r It is the SEC's dury to prevent these breaches of trust; these scandals call into question the effectiveness of the SEC. Because scandals become a threat to the existence of the
SEC, they are quickly addressed, usually by a law mandating an increased
disclosure of some sore. Proposals that suggest new market self-regulation
would be a better solution than SEC oversight are consistently dismissed.'ij
Unfortunately, once a law is passed-there is question as to why
Sarbanes-Oxley passed as quickly as it did, without rime tO thoroughly consider the ramifications-it usually takes on a life of its own, becoming extremely difficult to revoke. 1~ "The market correctS irs mistakes; regulators
frequently resist doing so."-">
While the SEC may have the investor's best interests at heart, it is wise
to remember that overregulation will lead only to a depression in companies'
abiliry to operate. It remains to be seen what the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley
will be. More legislation is not the answer and will only create more
.problems than it proposes to fix.
l• Apparently, the Behavioral Economic Theory, which is yet ro be defined,
won rhe Nobel Prize for Economics recendy. I will admit rhat "Behavioral Economics and the SEC" is a fascinating read rhat delicately sledgehammers the poim that
the SEC is inadequate ro fulfill its duties. Stanford Law Review 56 (2003): 4.
1' Sranfind Law Review 56 (2003): 24.
2
~ Ibid., 5.
.N Ibid., 39.
J(l From "Behavioral Economics and rhe SEC," the SEC's mission is rhreefold
as summarized by Arthur Levitt, chairman of rhe SEC: "Invesror protecdon is our
legal m:uH.late. lnvesror prorecrion is our moral responsihiliry. lnvesror protection is
my top personal prioriry," Stmiford Law Review 56 (200.3): 7.
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Considering all these implausible solutions to an apparent crisis of ethics
d faith among the American people and irs business, how, then, can faith
be restored? The short answer is rhat it can't-at least, not immediately. Even
if all the suggested fixes are taken into practice and the companies survive
such costly changes as a major restructuring, it will not be enough to quickly
restore the faith of the public. That return of trust will be a long time coming and must be earned ten rimes over. The culture of business ethics will remain unchanged so long as students continue to embrace the shifting, sandy
foundation of a relativist basis for ethics, believing that the financial success
of a company trumps inregriry on any day of the week. Scandals will continue despite the extreme penalties imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley and the
newly awakened SEC. No law can induce honesty.
Unfortunately, there is no easy ancidote preventing consumers, customers, and invesrors from being taken in by companies that seem sound
bur are instead a house of cards behind a well-constructed fas;ade. The best
solution requires work that begins with lhe establishment of an absolute
moral ground for our M BAs and all those who make a living in our capitalist economy. It requires the ethical training and honesry of all those who
work in our capitalist economy. Most of all, it requires a special level of care
among those who do business with int:u1gible productS, parricularly
telecommunications, to maintain the integriry of its employees and leaders.

